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Philosophers of art use the term ‘seeing-in’ to describe an important part of our 
experience of pictures: we often ‘see’ a picture’s subject matter ‘in’ its surface. This 
paper proposes that seeing-in is illuminated by a perceptual phenomenon that has 
received extensive attention in perceptual psychology: the perception of 
transparency. It is generally accepted that transparency perception is governed by 
laws of ‘scission’. I argue that some instances of seeing-in can be straightforwardly 





Philosophers disagree on the conditions that must hold for a viewer to understand a 
picture, but most agree that understanding a picture usually involves the experience of 
seeing-in: a visual awareness of the picture’s subject matter ‘in’ the picture’s surface. 
This paper proposes that seeing-in is illuminated by a perceptual phenomenon that has 
received extensive attention in perceptual psychology: transparency perception. Some, 
but not all examples of seeing-in can be understood as instances of transparency 
perception. In the case of pictures, these examples will typically involve a visual 
experience of both picture surface and subject matter, so that the subject matter 
appears as if seen through the surface of the picture. This proposal is unlikely to seem 
initially appealing: picture surfaces are not typically physically transparent, nor do we 
usually report that picture surfaces appear transparent. Rather we think we perceive 
them as they typically are, as opaque surfaces. This part of my proposal is more subtle 
than it appears in this bald formulation. Perhaps most notably, perception of 
transparency can occur in the absence of physical transparency, and it is this 
phenomenon which I argue has a role in pictorial experience. We might be more 
comfortable speaking of a transparency ‘illusion’, or a ‘transparency effect’ (as I do in 
my title). However, I will tend to follow the psychological literature on the topic in 
using the phrase ‘transparency perception’ in this way. Partly this is because much of 
my discussion is directly concerned with the psychological literature. It also reflects a 
fact that this literature makes plain: that perception of transparency, whether in the 
presence or absence of physical transparency, exhibits the same general 
phenomenology and is governed by the same laws. I will also consider the 
implications of this approach to other examples of seeing-in, including the 
archetypally Wollheimian instances of seeing-in. Although they are not instances of 
transparency perception, I argue that they are substantially illuminated by an 
understanding of it – and in a way that justifies a substantial revision of the current 
understanding of the experience of seeing-in and by extension, of our experience of 
pictures. 
 
 The plan of the paper is as follows. I first introduce the concept of seeing-in as 
it is presented by Richard Wollhiem, and begin to revise his understanding of it, 
drawing on work by John Kulvicki. Note that seeing-in is essentially twofold for 
Wollheim, but that on my account it is not. In particular we shall find that some 
archetypal instances of seeing-in on Wollheim’s account, involving the awareness of 
textured paint, do not meet the definition of twofoldness I develop. I then turn to 
accounts of transparency perception. Transparency perception is an extensively 
studied topic in perceptual psychology and it is generally accepted that its 
phenomenology is governed by laws of ‘scission’ that relate ‘stimulus’ properties to 
the experiences they can give rise to. I use a range of images to argue that all seeing-
in is subject to these laws, and that certain instances of seeing-in should be understood 
as a kind of transparency perception. Other examples of seeing-in, those where paint 
texture is clearly visible, do not seem transparent. But we shall also find that the 
phenomenology of these examples is also different from that described by Wollheim. 
I call this phenomenology ‘imbrication’, for subject matter and paint seem imbricated 
in the same space: it is close to, if not identical with, the experience Robert Hopkins 
has called unitary inflected seeing-in. Like the experience outlined by Hopkins, it 
turns out not to be twofold. I go on to make a more detailed examination of 
imbrication and its relation to the phenomenon of inflection. I conclude by describing 
the conditions that distinguish seeing-in from other forms of transparency perception, 




Seeing-in, Wollheim held, involves a visual awareness of a surface, Y, and also, 
simultaneously, a visual awareness of some object, X, ‘in’ the surface.2 Thus his term 
                                               
1 This article is largely consistent with my earlier work on depiction, but it 
substantially develops my account of pictorial experience, and as I shall indicate, 
revises some aspects of that account. (Michael Newall, What is a Picture? Depiction, 
Realism, Abstraction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2011), esp. 33–35) 
2 His early account is in Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980), supplementary essay 5. The later formulation is 
found in Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press), 1987, 46–77. 
‘seeing-in’, and his talk of ‘seeing X in Y’. To describe the double awareness that 
seeing-in involves, Wollheim enlisted the term ‘twofoldness’. The twofold character 
of seeing-in contrasts with what we might call the ‘single fold’ of ordinary visual 
perception. In his early formulation of the concept he conceived of seeing-in as 
involving two separate experiences (one of the surface, and one of the object or state 
of affairs seen in it). He later came to understand seeing-in to be a single experience 
with two aspects. It is this later conception that I address here. Seeing-in can occur 
outside the realm of human-made artefacts or arise from an accidental marking, as 
when one sees a landscape in a cloud formation, or a face in an inkblot. In neither 
case does the visual awareness of the seen-in object preclude the simultaneous 
awareness of the surfaces in which they are seen. We remain, for instance, visually 
aware of the shape, colour, and fluid character of the inkblot, at the same time as we 
see in it a grotesque face. Of special interest to Wollheim, pictures can occasion 
seeing-in – in particular, we see in them their subject matter. That is, pictures can 
occasion a visual awareness of the picture surface – the flat, drawn, printed or painted 
surface of the picture – and a simultaneous awareness of the three-dimensional 
arrangement of objects that comprises the picture’s subject matter. Wollheim claimed 
that seeing a picture’s subject matter in its surface is a necessary condition for 
understanding the picture. There is significant doubt that seeing-in is involved in 
every instance of pictorial understanding – in particular it is now widely doubted that 
trompe l’oeil painting arouses this experience – but the idea that seeing-in usually 
accompanies the understanding of pictures, and ordinarily plays a role in 
understanding pictures, has become widespread.3 
                                               
3 See, for example, Jerrold Levinson, ‘Wollheim on Pictorial Representation’, Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (1998), 227–33; and Dominic McIver Lopes, 
  A point about the examples of seeing-in I use: I focus exclusively on seeing-in 
occasioned by pictures, and not at all on seeing-in arising from natural or accidental 
marks. Picture-makers have extensively and systematically explored the diverse ways 
marks can be manipulated to occasion seeing-in. By comparison, natural and 
accidental markings only exercise this ability partially and unsystematically. So it is 
to pictures that an account of seeing-in must primarily address itself if it is to be 
convincing. 
 
 I will begin to develop my account of seeing-in by giving an account of just 
how surface and the things seen-in it appear spatially related. I draw especially on 
John Kulvicki’s analysis here, as he brings together a range of arguments to this end.4 
Once this relation is clarified, I go on to examine how this illuminates twofoldness 
and suggests a new approach to understanding seeing-in using the concept of 
transparency perception. 
 
2. Relating seen-in space to actual space 
 
Kulvicki points out that for Wollheim, each aspect of seeing-in is an ‘aspect of 
visual experience, and visual experience presents things as being before one’s 
eyes’.5 But how, he asks, can two things, picture and subject matter, appear to 
be simultaneously before one’s eyes without seeming to be in some kind of 
                                                                                                                                      
Understanding Pictures (Oxford: OUP, 1996), 49–50. 
4 John V. Kulvicki , ‘Heavenly Sight and the Nature of Seeing-In’, Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67 (2009), 387–97, at 390–392.  
5 Ibid., 391. 
spatial relationship? The fact that they both appear in a simultaneous spatial 
relation to the viewer implies that they must also appear as spatially related to 
one another. Kulvicki is specific about what that spatial relation is: ‘there is a 
strong sense in which depicted scenes seem to recede from the canvas.’6 Other 
considerations suggest the same idea. Kulvicki observes that Michael Podro and 
Dominic Lopes, among others, have elegantly described how pictures address 
us in our space, or invite our imagined interaction in theirs.7 In the famous 
recruiting poster, Uncle Sam, in an arresting gesture, seems to point out of the 
picture’s space, addressing the viewer. The handle of a knife in a Dutch still life 
seems to points toward us, inviting us to imagine grasping it and cutting a slice 
from the half-peeled fruit that seems to lie a little deeper in the picture’s space. 
Such observations are not new. Leon Battista Alberti, the Renaissance art 
theorist, described pictures as akin to windows: 
I will tell what I do when I paint. First of all … I inscribe a quadrangle of 
right angles, as large as I wish, which is considered to be an open window 
through which I see what I want to paint.8 
 Again the implication is that the subject matter seems to lie behind the picture 
surface. There is an exception, which will come up again toward the end of this paper: 
occasionally, depicted objects seem to occupy a space in front of the picture surface 
                                               
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 392. Kulvicki draws on Michael Podro, Depiction (Yale University Press, 
1998), 64, 71, 79; and Dominic McIver Lopes, Sight and Sensibility: Evaluating 
Pictures (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 1. 
8 Leon Battista Alberti, On Painting, trans. John R. Spencer, rev. edn (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 55–56. 
rather than behind it. One famous example is found in Caravaggio’s first Supper at 
Emmaus (1601, National Gallery, London), in which the surprised apostles seem to 
thrust limbs and furniture right out of the picture in their surprise.9 Though it is rarely 
commented on, the effect is also evident in certain anamorphic pictures. The skull in 
Holbein’s The Ambassadors (1533, National Gallery, London), for instance, when 
seen from the correct viewpoint, appears to weirdly float out at the viewer, its lower 
jaw especially appearing some distance in front of the canvas. 
 Kulvicki also draws on Robert Hopkins to support his position. Hopkins’ 
remarks are of particular interest because they suggest a way in which Kulvicki’s 
analysis can be refined. Hopkins observes that the viewer ‘can point … at marks on 
the [picture] surface, thereby identifying objects in the depicted space … without 
having to struggle’. So ‘although distinct’, the experiences of real space and depicted 
space ‘are neatly integrated’.10 The phenomenon is a familiar one. If a viewer of a 
Last Judgement is asked to point out where Christ is in the depicted scene, they will 
have no trouble doing so. They point at the picture surface as if through a window, at 
where Christ seems to be within the depicted space. It is the notion of pointing that 
allows a refinement to be made to Kulvicki’s position. For when asked to point at 
Christ, the viewer not only points at the place Christ seems to be; in the process they 
point at precisely the marks on the canvas that depict Christ. Indeed, if one points at 
any depicted detail in a picture, one finds oneself also pointing at precisely those 
                                               
9 Howard Hibbard, Caravaggio (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), 77. 
10 Robert Hopkins, Picture, Image and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 196. As seen below Hopkins does not wholly endorse my 
position. See also Kulvicki, ‘Heavenly Sight and the Nature of Seeing-In’, 391. 
marks that depict it. To put it another way, when the subject matter seems to appear 
behind the picture surface, the marks appear to overlap precisely those parts of the 
subject matter they depict. And in cases where subject matter appears to project in 
front of the picture surface, the depicted objects appear to overlap just the marks that 
depict them. 
 Let me gather together and address some objections. John Hyman doubts that 
picture surface and subject matter appear related as I have described. Speaking of one 
of Picasso’s rose period paintings, The Two Brothers (1906, Kunstmuseum Basel), 
depicting a standing boy bearing a smaller boy on his back, he observes, ‘the boy does 
not appear to me to be standing in any particular spatial relation to the painting 
surface.’11 That seems to me plain wrong; the boy does appear oriented in some 
direction or another in relation to the painting’s surface. In particular his body appears 
obliquely angled toward the picture surface, just as he appears to look out towards the 
viewer, his gaze meeting ours. 
 While that objection is easily countered, it could be seen to raise a more 
complex concern, which Hopkins articulates.12 This hinges on the fact that as one 
moves (say, shifting from left to right) in front of a picture, one’s relation to its 
surface shifts, but that one’s perspective on the subject matter does not change. As a 
viewer moves around the Picasso, their spatial relation to the surface changes, but as 
Hopkins puts it ‘no change in relation to a picture will bring new facets of the object 
                                               
11 John Hyman, The Objective Eye: Color, Form and Reality in the Theory of Art 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 133. 
12 Robert Hopkins, ‘Seeing-in and Seeming to See’, Analysis 72 (2012), 650–659, at 
656–659. 
into view.’13 Rather, the boys still seem to face the viewer at the same angle. The 
trouble for my account is that when we see an object through a transparent surface, 
this does not occur : instead, when we move our spatial relation to both surface and 
the object seen through it changes. So, Hopkins concludes, seeing-in cannot be a 
species of transparency perception. However, this line of thinking makes an error, for 
our experience of a picture’s subject matter as we move around it changes in odd 
ways, some of which Hopkins does not consider. First, as Hopkins notes, the subject 
appears to change shape as we move. So Picasso’s boys appear to grow thin as we 
move to the side. Second, and crucially in this context, they appear to turn to face the 
viewer. Or to put it better, all the subject matter in the picture appears to orient itself, 
so that it continues to face the viewer as it did before, and without any new parts 
becoming visible. This aspect of our experience of pictures is not often noticed, but it 
is always available if we care to look for it as we move to and fro in front of pictures, 
especially from a close viewpoint. The effect is perhaps most obtrusive in the case of 
portraits whose ‘eyes follow you around the room’ – in fact a feature of all portraits in 
which the subject’s eyes appear to face out towards the viewer. Like the apparent 
narrowing of subject matter, the effect is a straightforward result of the changing 
pattern of light the picture presents as we move in front of it. This pattern constrains 
our vision, so that so far as we can make out the depicted subject matter, we 
experience it as compressed laterally, and re-oriented so that our apparent view of it 
remains unchanged. So the right response to Hopkins’ criticism is to maintain that 
seeing-in is here exactly akin to transparency perception, although not to perception 
of the subject matter as we would experience it face-to-face, but rather as we would 
experience it if it were to undergo the strange and unlifelike deformations of 
                                               
13 Ibid., ‘Seeing and Seeming to See’, 657. 
contraction and reorientation it appears to undergo in pictures. 
 Let me turn to another objection, drawn from Hyman. He observes how in the 
case of a ‘simple line drawing of a human figure on plain paper’ … ‘the ink marks 
[can] seem to stand above the paper’s surface.’14 He observes that this is an apparent 
relation between the ink marks and the paper – not the subject matter, and this raises 
the concern that what I have been considering apparent spatial relations between 
subject and picture surface, are in fact apparent spatial relations between elements of 
the picture surface. Hyman adds that he doubts that these perceptions occur in a 
reliable way (‘there is no reason to suppose they must’), and notes that they can also 
occur in non-pictorial contexts, such as in our perception of text on a white page.15 
The worry here is that if I have mistaken such a phenomenon for the one I am 
seeking, my claims will fail. 
 One might expect that the best approach to this problem lies in carefully 
distinguishing these phenomena from one another. But I believe the correct approach 
in fact draws them together. Wollheim provides the key to understanding this in his 
analysis of abstract painting.16 There he points out that many arrangements of non-
figurative elements appear to be related in spatial ways. Lines can appear to run back 
and forth in space, like a wire sculpture, and shapes can appear to float in front of one 
another.17 Now, these spatial properties are not actually present – the painted surfaces 
                                               
14 Hyman, The Objective Eye, 133. 
15 Ibid., 133–134. 
16 Wollheim, Painting as an Art, 62.  
17 Painters and critics from Kandinsky to Clement Greenberg have examined and 
written about these kinds of phenomena. See Newall, What is a Picture?, 172–176, 
that give rise to them are quite flat. Moreover, it is possible to simultaneously 
maintain a visuall awareness of this spatiality and the flatness of the painted surface.18 
Wollheim thus holds that the experience of abstract painting often involves seeing-in. 
The same analysis can be made of Hyman’s drawn lines. Seeing the black lines of ink 
as standing over the paper on which they are in fact inscribed is a simple instance of 
seeing-in. Whether this seeing-in contributes to, or detracts from the full experience of 
seeing-in that the artist intended to afford, it is an experience of seeing-in 
nevertheless, and will answer to the account I will give of it, as much as it does 
Wollheim’s. The same can be said for Hyman’s example of text. So far as letters seem 
to float over the surface on which they are printed, they too are instances of seeing-in.  
This analysis leaves my account safe, for it shows that even in Hyman’s examples, 
there it is seeing-in that requires explanation, and not some other phenomenon. 
3. Transparency perception and twofoldness 
 
My analysis leaves us with a puzzle. The picture surface and the things we see-in 
appear spatially related; most often the picture surface appears in front of the subject 
matter. Yet, the picture surface is opaque, which seems to rule out seeing anything 
behind it. How can these two facts be reconciled?19 I propose to resolve this puzzle in 
some instances by showing that one appears transparent, and the other appears as if 
                                                                                                                                      
194–195; and Michael Newall, ‘Painting and Philosophy’, Philosophy Compass 9 
(2014), 225–237, for discussion of this. 
18 One might reply that the lines and shapes, while apparently deployed in this new 
space, are unchanged – but while this can be true, it is is not necessarily so. They can 
seem glowing, transparent, or textured for instance.  
19 I thank Hans Maes for suggesting this way of presenting the problem. 
seen through it. Another approach may seem attractive; let me say something about 
this view, and my reasons for rejecting it: this is the account of seeing-in that Kulvicki 
goes on to develop. Kulvicki’s claim is that we are visually aware of the picture 
surface as opaque while simultaneously seeing through it: ‘seeing-in is a perceptual 
state in which an opaque object is experienced as being in front of another opaque 
object even though neither object is obscured by the other.’20 In this respect our 
resolutions of the puzzle directly contradict each another. The analysis that I will give 
shortly of examples of seeing-in can thus be seen as counter-examples to this claim in 
Kulvicki’s account. There is also a logical objection to his approach. So far as 
experiencing something as opaque involves not being visually aware of anything 
through it, there is a contradiction at the heart of his view. Kulvicki rejects this 
conception of the perception of opaqueness but I find it difficult to part with.21  
 
 To return then to the perception of transparency: transparency perception 
involves the visual perception of one object through another. As Fabio Metelli puts it, 
‘one perceives transparency when one sees not only surfaces behind a transparent 
medium but also the transparent medium or object itself.’22 Transparency perception 
has received substantial attention in perceptual psychology. Most of this relates to the 
visual experience of transparency and the conditions a stimulus must satisfy in order 
to occasion it. It is this research that I will be referring to. Note that I am not 
concerned here with the neurological activities that underlie transparency perception, 
                                               
20 Kulvicki, ‘Heavenly Sight and the Nature of Seeing-In’, 394. 
21 Ibid., 392–94.  
22 Fabio Metelli, ‘The Perception of Transparency’, Scientific American 230 (1974), 
90–98, at 91. 
although a literature on this does exist. I will draw especially on Metelli’s widely 
cited article on the topic, which I have already quoted from, as well as on more recent 
research. I will say more on transparency perception later; for now let me mention 
three points that will be relevant to my discussion. 
 
 First, transparency perception should be distinguished from physical 
transparency. A substance is physically transparency if light can be transmitted 
through it.23 Crucially for my proposal, transparency perception can occur without the 
presence of physical transparency.24 Mettelli is clear on this point, and it is worth 
noting that most of the experiments done on transparency perception since Metelli’s 
article do not use physically transparent surfaces as stimuli, but rather arrangements 
of coloured shapes that we are apt to perceive as transparent. (See, for a similar 
example, figure 1.) This is an important point for my proposal, because pictures (of 
course) are not generally physically transparent. 
 
 Second, in case there is any doubt, transparency perception is a species of 
ordinary seeing. Many visible things are physically transparent – and we are capable 
of perceiving them as such, that is we see through them to whatever lies behind them. 
Water and mist are obvious examples in the natural world, and coloured glass and 
                                               
23 This is Metelli’s definition (ibid.). It should be added that the transmitted light is 
not scattered, as it is with translucent materials such as frosted glass. 
24 Ibid. The reverse is also true: physical transparency need not give rise to the 
perception of transparency in a viewer. Metelli points out that a physically transparent 
film laid in the middle of an opaque field of undifferentiated colour will not appear 
transparent. 
plastics are often prominent examples among manufactured things. Transparency 
perception helps us understand and so negotiate our physical environment, and it is an 
ability that most likely evolved in our distant pre-human ancestors.25 The perceptual 
psychologist Patrick Cavanagh points out an even more common example of 
transparency perception, although one that occurs without the presence of physical 
transparency: shadows are perceived as transparent. That is, the perception of a 
shadowed surface is ordinarily akin to seeing its surface through a dark film.26 
 
 Third, like seeing-in, the perception of transparency involves a kind of twofold 
experience. Wollheim’s twofoldness involves the simultaneous visual awareness of 
two different things, such that one appears ‘in’ the other. It thus readily functions as a 
synonym for seeing-in. I make use of a different conception of twofoldness, that 
draws on the analysis of the previous section, and replaces the ‘in’ with the 
requirements of overlapping and visibility that I discussed there. Let me propose this 
definition: 
 
                                               
25 There are studies of transparency perception in animals (this is where neurological 
work on the topic is done). E.g. R. J. Snowden et al., ‘The Response of Area MT and 
V1 Neurons to Transparent Motion’, Journal of Neuroscience 11 (1991), 2768–2785, 
considers transparency perception in monkeys; R. J. A. van Wezel et al., ‘Responses 
of Complex Cells in Area 17 of the Cat to Bi-vectorial Transparent Motion’, Vision 
Research, 36 (1996), 2805–2813 treats transparency perception in cats. 
26 Patrick Cavanagh, ‘The Artist as Neuroscientist’, Nature 434 (2005), 301–307.  
A visual experience is twofold if and only if it is an experience of objects 
overlapping in which both overlapping and overlapped parts of the objects are 
simultaneously perceived. 
 
Note that ‘perception’ includes veridical and non-veridical perception: perception of 
any or all of these objects may not be counterfactually dependent on their actual 
presence before the viewer’s eyes.27  
 
 It may seem I have said too much here. The ‘only if’ is justified by my earlier 
analysis; but what about the ‘if’? Does this experience of overlapping without 
occlusion suffice for twofoldness? It may seem that something is missing – a closer 
sense of connectedness between surface and subject matter. I will say much about this 
later, where I analyse under the label of ‘imbrication’. But we will see there that the 
experience of imbrication does not involve an experience of overlapping, and so far as 
overlapping is a necessary condition for twofoldness, it must be set apart from 
twofoldness. Moreover, we shall see shortly that the examples of seeing-in that are 
twofold do not necessarily involve anything more than the experience of overlapping 
without occlusion. So the above definition will stand. 
 
 Keep in mind that on this account twofoldness can no longer be taken as a 
synonym for seeing-in, for two reasons. As I have said, we will see that some seeing-
in is not twofold in this sense. But equally this account of twofoldness  also describes 
transparency perception: we see the overlapped object through the transparent 
                                               
27 David Lewis, ‘Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision’, Australasian Journal 
of Philosophy 58 (1980), 239–249. 
overlapping object, giving us a simultaneous visual awareness of both. (fig. 1)28 So 





Figure 1. Perceptual transparency  
 
 
4. Laws of scission 
 
Let me now turn to transparency perception. According to Metelli, perception of 
transparent colours (both achromatic – that is, black, white and grey – and chromatic) 
is governed by a law of scission: 
 
With the perception of transparency the stimulus color splits into two 
different colors, which are called the scission colors. One of the scission 
colors goes to the transparent layer and the other to the surface of the 
figure below. … there is a simple relation between the stimulus and the 
                                               
28 This figure is intended to show one transparent surface overlapping an opaque 
surface, but some observers have told me that they see it as two transparent surfaces, 
through which the white ground can be seen. This would be an example of double 
transparency, which I discuss in section 7 (iv). 
scission colors: when a pair of scission colors are mixed, they re-create 
the stimulus color.29 
 
Figure 2 shows examples for achromatic colours. (i) and (ii) each give the impression 
of one transparent square overlapping another. In the areas of overlap, whose colours 
I indicate by c, one surface appears as if seen through another, that is, we perceive 
colour a seen through colour b (or vice versa). 
 
Figure 2. Achromatic transparency. 
 
 This law of scission tells us that, so far as each of these diagrams do occasion 
this perception, the mixture of colours a and b is colour c. It will be apparent that this 
                                               
29 Metelli, ‘The Perception of Transparency’, 93. 
formula holds in different ways in (i) and (ii), for while a and b are the same tone in 
both diagrams, c is not. In (i), c is darker than both a and b, and in (ii), c is a tone 
midway between a and b. Different kinds of mixture are thus operative in each of 
these diagrams. For this reason it will be better to talk of laws (rather than a single 
law) of scission. In (i) c is a subtractive mixture of a and b; in (ii), c is a fusion 
mixture of a and b. Both kinds of mixture can produce the effect of transparency, and 
both correspond with instances of transparency perception in the natural world.30 
Fusion mixture can be observed when a disc with segments of different colours is 
spun so that these ‘component’ colours appear to blend or ‘fuse’ into a single colour 
that occupies a midpoint between the tone and chroma of the component colours. This 
corresponds to the transparency observed when something is seen though a haze or 
fog. Subtractive mixture is familiar from the superimposition of coloured filters or 
gels. Light passing through a coloured filter has components subtracted from it. A 
filter will subtract brightness, and may also subtract aspects of hue (a red filter, for 
instance, will tend to subtract those wavelengths that fall outside those that give rise 
to the perception of redness. This corresponds to the effects of transparency when 
shadows overlap. It is widely accepted in the literature on transparency that the same 
two kinds of mixture – fusion and subtractive mixture – will also produce chromatic 
                                               
30 Metelli’s focus is on fusion mixture. Others have stressed subtractive mixture. (J. 
Beck, ‘Additive and Subtractive Mixture in Color Transparency’, Perception and 
Psychophysics 23 (1978), 265–67; J. Beck, K. Prazdny and R. Ivry, ‘The Perception 
of Transparency with Achromatic Colors’, Perception and Psychophysics 35 (1984), 
407–22.) 
transparency perception.31 It has more recently been found that other, related changes 
in colour can also achieve transparency effects.32 
 
 A similar law applies to the perception of texture. Takeo Watanabe and 
Cavanagh point out that ‘we see textures overlapped wherever there are transparent … 
structures interposed between the viewer and a background surface.’33 They observe 
that, like colour transparency, we can often perceive this overlap not as a new 
composite texture, but as one texture seen through the other: ‘We are able to 
decompose one texture from another even if parts of them are overlapped.’34 Figure 3 
shows an example of texture transparency. Texture is schematically indicated by 
dashes. Where the two textures interpenetrate, we do not tend to see a new composite 
texture; rather we see one texture through the other. Texture transparency can thus be 
understood to accord with a similar law of scission, in that the mixture of the texture 
                                               
31 Michael D’Zmura et al., ‘Color Transparency’, Perception 26 (1997), 471–92, at 
471–72. 
32 These are described by D’Zmura et al. Fusion can be understood as a convergence 
to a point in colour space between the overlapping colours; however, ‘the point to 
which colors converge can vary over a wide range and still lead to the perception of 
transparency.’ (478) Subtractive mixture can be understood as a particular kind of 
‘translation’ in a direction in colour space involving a decrease in luminance; but this 
decrease ‘is not necessary for the perception of transparency. Translation in any 
direction of color space will work.’ (477) 
33 Takeo Watanabe and Patrick Cavanagh, ‘Texture Laciness: The Texture Equivalent 
of Transparency?’, Perception 25 (1996), 293–303, at 293. 
34 Ibid. 





Figure 3. Texture transparency. Watanabe and Cavanagh, p. 294, fig. 1. (b). 
 
 Note that these conditions are not the only ones necessary to arouse perception 
of transparency. Metelli, for instance, also identifies certain ‘figural’ conditions for 
perceptual transparency which hold in the above examples.35 I will not dwell on these 
here. The kinds of examples I discuss below differ from the geometrical ‘mosaics’ 
Metelli (and most others) use to study the topic, so the figural conditions he proposes 
are not readily applicable. Nevertheless I allow that further conditions beyond those 
laws I have discussed may need to be fulfilled to establish the perception of 
transparency in the examples I will examine. 
 
 Before moving on let me address a concern philosophers may have about the 
treatment of colour here. For Metelli, stimulus colours are the ‘original’ colours of his 
                                               
35 Metelli, ‘The Perception of Transparency’, 92–93. 
mosaics.36 They are properties of surfaces such as luminance under particular 
illumination. This suggests that he identifies them with objective properties. However, 
scission colours are, in the case of Metelli’s mosaics and in other cases I will 
consider, subjective effects. This is apt to make philosophers uneasy: for how can any 
mixture of subjective effects be expected to give rise to something that accords with 
an objective measure, such as luminance? Although it is tempting to present the law 
of scission in more philosophically robust terms, I will not do so here, for this concern 
about its formulation can, with care, be put to one side. That is to say, in this context, 
the distinction between subjective and objective is not especially important. I say this 
for two reasons. First, objective properties, such as luminance, under certain 
constraints and with particular exceptions, will relatively reliably produce certain 
subjective effects (such as the perception of lightness and darkness) that accord with 
the objective state of affairs. Second, subjective colour effects can be compared to 
these veridical perceptions, and where a match occurs, we can consider the colours as 
having the same luminance. 
 
 Both these points are implicit in Metelli’s approach. Regarding the first point, 
Metelli allows that colours, including under certain circumstances stimulus colours, 
can be perceived truthfully. In particular, the stimulus colour can be perceived when 
transparency is not perceived (I will return to this point in the next section).37 Turning 
to the second point, we have seen that with the mosaics that Metelli and others use, 
the scission colours cannot be objectively measured, since they are subjective 
phenomena. But these colours can for the most part be reliably matched with coloured 
                                               
36 Ibid., 93. 
37 Ibid., 91. 
objects that do lend themselves to objective measurement, and the law of scission can 
be confirmed in this way. So in figure 2 (i), under a given illumination, the 
brightnesses of a, b and c can be readily measured objectively. However, the 
brightnesses of the scission colours, being subjective, cannot be so measured. 
Nevertheless the diagram can be used to measure these colours in another way, since 
viewers can assess whether tone c produces an impression of transparency in which 
tone a appears to be seen through tone b (or vice versa). In this way the viewer can 
assess whether the colours of the subjective scission effect match the objectively 
measurable tones a and b. Obviously, this easy movement between thinking of colour 
as objective and as subjective relies on an assumption that the objective and 
subjective are here closely linked. If that assumption is right, and I think it is in this 
context, the ambiguous approach that we find in Metelli and others will be harmless, 
or largely so. 
 
5. Application to seeing-in and other pictorial experience 
 
I propose that certain instances of seeing-in can be understood as a kind of 
transparency perception governed by laws of scission. In these cases, 
 
when seeing X in a surface, Y, the visible properties of Y are experienced 
as separated into two sets of scission properties. One set of properties is 
attributed to Y, and the other to X.  
 
It will also be useful to apply this to the sections of the picture surface: 
 
The visible properties of a section, S, of the surface are separated into one 
set of properties that is attributed to the part of X seen in S, and another 
set of properties that is attributed to S. 
 
In both cases, scission accords with the rules that govern transparency perception. So 
the scission properties, subjected to the appropriate kinds of mixture described in the 
previous section, will re-create the stimulus properties. 
 
 Let me first be clear about some implications of this. My proposal contradicts 
the idea that we do not perceive picture surfaces as transparent: while we do not 
always perceive the picture surface as transparent (as I will discuss shortly) in some 
cases we do. This goes against our common sense notion of pictures – that they are 
not experienced like, say, coloured or textured panes of glass. It also goes against 
Kulvicki’s explicit avowal: that we are aware not only of the picture surface, but of its 
colour, and indeed, opacity. Let me also be clear about where the idea of the scission 
of properties sits in relation to Kulvicki and Wollheim. Kulvicki holds, and I take it 
that Wollheim implies, that we can remain visually aware of the visible properties of 
the picture surface as belonging to the surface while seeing-in it the subject matter. 
My account contradicts that: we will still see those properties, but some will appear as 
belonging to the subject matter rather than the picture surface. I have not yet said 
anything about just how these properties are divided – which go to the subject matter 
and which remain with the picture surface. We shall see shortly they can be divided in 
a variety of ways. 
 
 I should also make a proviso here, for my proposal does allow one way in 
which we can perceive a picture surface as transparent, and also be visually aware of 
the picture surface as being an opaque surface having the properties it does in fact 
have. This occurs when the awarenesses are not simultaneous, but alternate. That is, 
the full awareness of the picture surface will alternate with the awareness of the 
surface as transparent. Metelli allows for such an alternating awareness in 
transparency perception: ‘if the region of superimposition [is isolated] (even if it is 
just by the attitude of the observer), then only the [stimulus] color is perceived.’38 So 
too, if we isolate the picture surface, by covering all except a patch of paint, or by 
moving in very closely, or ‘even if it is just by the attitude of the observer’ my 
proposal allows that we can have a visual awareness of the picture surface as coloured 
and opaque.39 So rather than saying that we are never visually aware of the picture 
surface as opaque (where my transparency claim applies), I hold that we cannot at the 
same time be visually aware of the picture surface as opaque, and be aware of the 
subject matter. 
 
 Metelli notes the existence of ‘limiting cases’ of transparency, and these will 
also prove to have pictorial counterparts. He states: ‘If all the color goes to the 
transparent layer, it becomes opaque. If all the color goes to the underlying surface, 
then the transparent layer becomes invisible. Transparency is perceived only when 
                                               
38 Ibid. 
39 This bears comparison with Gombrich’s idea of picture perception as 
alternating between awareness of the picture surface and awareness of the 
subject matter. (E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of 
Pictorial Representation (London: Phaidon Press, 1960), 3–6.) 
there is a distribution of the stimulus color to both the transparent layer and the 
opaque layer.’40 In the first pictorial counterpart, no properties are attributed to the 
subject matter; the surface remains opaque in its appearance, not just intermittently, as 
discussed above, but permanently, and so neither seeing-in nor pictorial understanding 
occur. This is therefore a kind of pictorial failure; we would merely see the surface as 
it actually is. In the second pictorial counterpart, all the picture surface’s visible 
properties are attributed to the subject matter, and the viewer loses all visual 
awareness of the picture surface. The picture surface will seem to have something of 
the quality of a clear pane of non-reflecting glass through which the subject matter is 
seen. These are further examples where our experience is not twofold. However, I will 
talk about the latter case in detail since it is predicted by my account, and because 
some pictures do occasion this experience. Instances of these include pictures that 
tend to occasion a mistaken belief in the viewer that they are in fact in the presence of 
the subject matter, such as some trompe l’oeil. As Dominic Lopes notes, ‘trompe 
l’oeil demonstrates that what it is like to see an object in a picture need not be 
discontinuous with what it is like to see that object in plain sight.’41 Other kinds of 
pictures can also preclude visual awareness of the picture surface per se. Certain 
Dutch and Flemish paintings (such as those of Jan van Eyck) have facture that can be 
imperceptible to ordinary vision, and the same can be true of colour photographs with 
a fine grain. These do not tend to deceive us (we know they are in fact a flat, 
manufactured surface), but especially at a distance they can preclude visual awareness 
of their surface.42 
                                               
40 Metelli, ‘The Perception of Transparency’, 94. 
41 Lopes, Understanding Pictures, 49. 
42 For further discussion of such pictures, see Newall, What is a Picture?, 25–26.  
  Let me start my examples by considering in detail one such case, the 
reproduction of the photographic image of a glass of milk that features on various 
Penguin Modern Classics editions of Anthony Burgess’s novel A Clockwork 
Orange.43 The milk is depicted by a white, or slightly grey colour. Here my claim is 
that this colour is wholly attributed to the subject matter – the milk – which appears as 
if a little behind the picture surface. While we have this experience, the picture 
surface appears as if it lacks all its colour properties. It appears, one might say, 
transparent to the point of invisibility. Note that we do not see different colours when 
we alternate between a visual awareness of only the picture surface, and a visual 
awareness that incorporates the subject matter. Rather, we attribute the same colour to 
different objects – we experience the white colour as belonging to the picture surface 
in the first instance, and in the second instance, to the subject matter’s surface, to the 
milk. 
 
 The difference between these two experiences can be directly compared. 
Versions of the cover include in the design a strip of white above or below the 
photograph. In all cases this white is a similar (sometimes slightly brighter) colour to 
that which depicts the milk, but it has no depictive content; we see it only as a feature 
of the surface of the cover design.44 Compare this to the white colour we see the milk 
                                               
43 At the time of writing, covers of these editions can be readily found on the internet. 
See for instance, www.goodreads.com/book/show/6392169-a-clockwork-orange 
(accessed 20 October 2014), which shows an edition from 2000. 
44 Let me put aside the possibility that it is seen as floating above the surface, along 
the lines suggested by Hyman’s remarks (discussed in section 2). 
as having. In these two cases, we experience much the same colour, but attribute it to 
a different object. My claim is that when visually aware of the milk, we have no 
visual awareness of the white as belonging to the picture surface, as we do when we 
examine the white stripes of the cover design. Rather, the white colour appears 
pushed back a little way into the virtual space of the picture, attached to the surface of 
the milk rather than the book cover. 
 
 It could be objected that we do retain an awareness of the surface as white and 
opaque. I would agree with this, but with the crucial qualification that this awareness 
is not at that moment part of one’s visual experience. Consider here the glass depicted 
in the photograph through which the milk is seen. Where it is free of reflections, it is 
quite invisible: we have no visual awareness of its surface. I suggest that our visual 
experience of the subject matter through the picture surface is comparable to the 
visual experience of seeing the milk through the glass. We seem to see the milk 
through the picture surface just as we seem to see it through the surface of the glass. 
What is markedly different in the experiences of these things is not part of the visual 
phenomenology, but of other kinds of awareness. We know of the presence of both 
surfaces (through various contextual cues, our prior experiences and so on); we are 
aware of what kinds of surfaces they are and where they are; but in neither case do we 
have a visual awareness of the surface.  
 
6. Case studies 
  
I now turn to examples of seeing-in, starting with relatively straightforward cases, and 
progressing to more complex and challenging examples for my proposal. As I have 
mentioned, these include instances of twofold perception and transparency, and the 
non-twofold perception I call imbrication. 
 
(i) A glossy photograph 
 
This example, and the next, are both instances of twofoldness and transparency. The 
flat, glossy surface of a photograph, or of other pictures, such as the book cover, will 
under certain viewing conditions have a reflective shine to part of the surface, through 
which one can nevertheless make out the picture’s subject matter. The effect of such 
partial reflection is no longer like looking through non-reflective transparent glass, but 
usually like looking through a white veil or mist. Here, the colour associated with the 
reflection is typically attributed to the picture surface, while the other colours are 
attributed to the subject matter. Partially reflected light will produce a fusion mixture 
between its colours and those of the reflective surface (since it involves the mixture of 
light). So this example straightforwardly accords with a law of scission, for a fusion 
mixture of the scission colours will here recreate the stimulus colour. 
 
(ii) A sepia photograph 
 
I take it that a sepia toned photograph, despite its colouration will usually not 
occasion the experience of yellowish subject matter. Perhaps I am wrong about this, 
and people typically do find sepia photos as occasioning experiences of yellow 
things.45 But so far as this is the case, sepia photographs would then instead fall under 
the previous category of picture, doing no damage to my overall approach. Assuming 
I am right, then, sepia photographs afford an experience that can be likened to that of 
seeing the subject matter through a filter-like device that translates all the hues into 
                                               
45 Hopkins’ discussion of his concept of ‘separation’ in Picture, Image and 
Experience suggests that he thinks I am indeed wrong about this (e.g., at 128.). 
corresponding shades of yellow. Here the picture surface’s hue (that is, yellow) is 
attributed to the picture surface, while the surface’s tonal properties are attributed to 
subject matter. This example also straightforwardly accords with the laws of scission, 
for a subtractive mixture of yellow with an appropriate variety of white, black and 
grey tonal properties will result in the variety of yellowish tones that actually 
characterise the picture surface.  
 
(iii) Paintings with visible brushstrokes. 
 
This is a more complex case, but it is also a crucial one for my proposal, since the 
experience of paintings with visibly impasted brushwork is a typical Wollheimian 
example of seeing-in.  
 
 My account here has two parts. The first is my transparency proposal. This 
applies to only a few unusual paintings, and to sections of rather more paintings. In 
these cases we experience the brushstrokes’ colours as belonging to the subject 
matter, while their textures are attributed to the picture surface. Seeing-in here 
involves an awareness of the brushstrokes covering the picture surface as transparent 
textures through which the colours of the subject matter are seen. The experience, 
visually, is like seeing the subject matter through textured glass. 
 
 I think it is clear that we do experience certain parts of some pictures in this 
way. The effect is readily observed when the subject matter is not itself textured. For 
instance, when a clear blue sky is painted with visibly discernible blue brushstrokes, 
the blue of the sky appears as if seen through a textured, but otherwise perfectly 
transparent surface. Occasionally the entire surface of a painting can promote this 
textural scission. Those with a thick, broadly brushed undercoat and a thinly painted 
picture over the top can achieve this effect. The effect is most clearly seen in a 
context, somewhat outside painting, where it is achieved systematically: in certain 
kinds of mass produced prints, such as the ‘oilette’ postcards published by Raphael 
Tuck & Sons in the early twentieth century. These are reproductions of paintings, 
printed on card embossed with a brushstroke pattern. The embossed pattern of 
brushstrokes gives the impression of a transparent texture through which the subject 
matter of the reproduced painting is seen.46 
 
 However, most paintings do not afford such experiences. The brushwork in 
many paintings, such as Rembrandt’s Self-Portrait as the Apostle Paul (1661, 
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam), to take an example where the effect is readily apparent, 
appears for the most part not as a transparent surface, but as closely imbricated with 
the subject matter it depicts. The second part of my analysis is addressed to this. 
Watanabe and Cavanagh, in their work on the perception of texture transparency, 
identify conditions under which scission does and does not occur.47 Of interest here, 
when elements of overlapping textures line up with one another and are of the same 
size, scission tends to be resisted, and the viewer instead is more likely to perceive a 
single composite texture at the area of overlap. In figure 4, the left hand diagram 
                                               
46 Photographic reproductions of oilettes only produce this effect if they are made in 
raking light, so that the embossing is apparent. The website www.edinphoto.org.uk 
(accessed 20 October 2014) has an example, showing an oilette of Charles E. 
Flower’s Castle and National Gallery, Edinburgh. 
47 Watanabe and Cavanagh, ‘Texture Laciness’. 
shows this phenomenon, while the diagram on the right shows that the oblique 




Figure 4. Watanabe and Cavanagh, details from fig. 5, p. 296. 
 
 The relation of the embossed brushstrokes of the oilette with the depicted 
textures of its subject matter satisfies Watanabe and Cavanagh’s conditions for 
scission. The embossed brushstrokes, readily apparent, especially in raking light, are 
much larger than the depicted textural elements (clumps of foliage, puffs of cloud, in 
a typical Tuck & Sons image), and rather than being oriented the same way, they cut 
across them. Accordingly, we tend to experience the textures of the embossed 
brushstrokes as belonging to a transparent surface, through which the finer textures of 
the subject matter itself are seen. The painting of a patch of blue sky or a smooth 
surface allows a similar analysis, since the texture of the painting is wholly unrelated 
to the lack of texture the subject matter. 
 
 But in Rembrandt’s painting, the brushstrokes, in terms of size, shape and 
orientation, often function as equivalents for the textures of the depicted subject 
                                               
48 Ibid., 294–97. 
matter. They do not reproduce the texture of the subject matter in any exacting way – 
indeed they remain recognizably the textures of brushstrokes – but they often present 
a comparable ‘grain’, running in the same direction as the textures of the subject 
matter. Most prominently, the long curving folds of the turban Rembrandt wears are 
depicted with long curving brushstrokes. The brushstrokes also follow sags and 
creases of Rembrandt’s face, and curls of his hair are traced with similarly curling 
lines of paints. At the same time that the paint’s texture is used in this way, 
Rembrandt also manipulates tone to depict textures. This is done in the familiar way 
that other kinds of forms are modelled using tone: illuminated parts of the texture are 
rendered using a lighter tone, and shaded parts in a darker tone. Now, a critical point: 
to a significant degree the marks used to lay down these areas of tone and the textural 
marks I have discussed are the same marks. That is, in the process of creating the 
patterns of tone that depict textural qualities, Rembrandt lays down these textural 
marks. 
 
 Watanabe and Cavanagh’s work suggests that we should not be surprised to 
find that this combination of techniques acts to resist textural scission. Where tone 
and texture are laid down in the same strokes, as we see in those sections of 
Rembrandt’s self-portrait that I have mentioned, the elements of the depicted texture 
and actual texture will be similar in size and orientation, and so they are attributed to a 
single surface, that of the subject matter.49 Here the textures of the paint appear 
                                               
49 There is also an important disanalogy between the textural transparency described 
by Watanabe and Cavanagh, and our perception of the Rembrandt. In fig. 4, we do not 
tend to see the composite texture as belonging to one of the two squares; rather it 
appears to belong to a third surface. But with the Rembrandt, the composite texture 
imbricated with the subject matter in its own space. This creates the appearance of a 
composite texture, comprised of the texture that the picture is depicted as having 
through the manipulation of tone, and the texture of the paint, which we also attribute 
to the depicted surface.50 More needs to be said about what the experience of 
imbrication is like, and how it relates to the experience of the individual components. 
I return to these questions in the next section. For now, note that this experience is not 
twofold on the account I have given. There is no appearance of overlapping of one 
object by another; instead we perceive their visible properties as combined in a single 
object. 
                                                                                                                                      
does not give us a visual awareness of such a third surface that is neither the surface 
of the picture nor that of the subject matter. In this case we have an awareness of only 
the single composite texture, and we experience this as occupying the space of the 
subject matter. This is partly related to the fact that picture surface and subject matter 
appear to precisely overlap. Hence the composite texture we perceive in a Rembrandt 
does not sit side by side its components as in fig 4.; rather it entirely incorporates 
them. That still leaves the question of why we should see this composite texture as 
within the picture space, rather than (say) on the picture surface. I will leave this 
detail unexplained here, as I don’t see that Watanabe and Cavanagh’s account – 
developed to account for rather simpler perceptions of texture (in particular, 
perceptions of flat textured surfaces rather than volumetric textured surfaces), 
provides the resources to explain this. I thank Hans Maes for raising this issue. 
50 It is worth adding that this gives the painting a sense of physical presence that it 
would not otherwise have. (A photograph of a similar subject lit with similarly 
dramatic, raking light, would not give the same sense of presence as Rembrandt’s 
painting.) 
  To sum up, for paintings with textured brushwork, my proposal is that seeing-
in involves either an experience of transparency, or of imbrication. Different parts of 
the same painting may sustain different kinds of experience. (Perhaps the more 
summarily painted parts of Rembrandt’s self-portrait, such as the background, act in 
the first way.) Note that this analysis is testable: where the elements of paint texture 
are oriented in the same direction and of the same size as elements of tonally depicted 
texture, it predicts that imbrication will be experienced. Where these conditions do not 
hold, it predicts that a transparency effect will occur. I would encourage the reader 
who wants further evidence to seek out paintings herself to test in this way.  
 
(iv) Pictures that are physically transparent 
 
Before returning to imbrication in the next section, let me address two other kinds of 
pictures that provide challenges for my account. The first of these are pictures that are 
physically transparent. Stained glass windows provide the most obvious examples, but 
I will avoid using these, since they are usually designed so that things are not clearly 
visible on the other side of it (not least through the common use of translucent glass 
rather than, or alongside, transparent glass). So take instead a pane of coloured glass, 
on to which is printed in a dark transparent ink a photographic image. One could think 
of it as a physically transparent version of the sepia photograph I discussed above. If 
this glass is set into a window frame, we will be able to see things through it, and 
perhaps with a little concentration we will be able to maintain a visual awareness of 
the scene on the other side of the glass, while it continues to function as a picture – 
that is, while we are also simultaneously aware of the depicted subject matter and the 
coloured glass. The worry here is how a picture surface can appear transparent, when 
it is already physically transparent and perceived as such. 
  This example can be successfully tackled once one understands that 
psychological accounts of transparency perception allow for the perception of what 
we may call multiple transparency. So, in double transparency, we will perceive 
objects as overlapping, without any occlusion occurring (fig. 5).51 In such cases a 
more complex scission occurs, the stimulus colour being divided between three 
surfaces where the three surfaces overlap. 
 
 
Figure 5. Double transparency 
 
 
 This allows an easy solution to the problem – and one that rings true with our 
experiences of pictures on transparent surfaces. The scission into three parts comes 
out as follows: (i) we remain aware of features of the glass such as its hue and 
reflective shine; (ii) as with the sepia photograph, we are aware of the depicted 
subject matter, attributing to it the tonal values of the ink; and (iii) we see the scene 
                                               
51 The artist and educator Josef Albers also explored such double transparency effects 
(Josef Albers, Interaction of Color, New Complete Edition, 2 vols. (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2009), vol. 2, plates to section X-1.  
behind the glass. Each of these three awareness occurs simultaneously. So the glass 
and depicted subject matter will both appear as transparent, and through them both we 
will see the scene outside.52 The subject matter will typically appear behind the glass, 
and the scene visible through the glass will typically appear behind the subject matter.  
 
 A point to note: this experience, and the visual experience figure 5 occasions, 
are no longer twofold. In these experiences three (rather than two) visible surfaces 
appear to overlap without occlusion. That is, on the account I have developed, they 
are threefold. More could be said about threefold experiences, and perhaps 
experiences with further folds too. A Wollheimian might object that an account that 
requires such multiple folds is at a disadvantage on account of this apparent 
profligacy. I think the reverse is the case, for the Wollheimian will encounter a similar 
challenge herself: in the case of pictures that depict other pictures. Such pictures may 
require that the viewer (i) sees in the picture surface the depicted picture’s surface, 
and (ii) sees in that depicted surface the subject matter the depicted picture depicts. 
Since seeing-in for Wollheim involves simultaneous awareness of picture surface and 
subject matter, it follows that in such examples one must have an awareness of three 
elements simulataneously: picture surface, depicted picture surface, and depicted 
picture’s subject matter – i.e. one must have a threefold awareness (a conclusion I 
                                               
52 Another possibility, especially if there are objects only just behind the glass, is that 
these may appear to be in front of the subject matter. My expectation, drawn from 
analysis in (v), is that where a physically opaque object seems to lie in front of the 
subject matter, the opaque object will appear transparent and the subject matter will 
appear opaque. 
would also, roughly, endorse). That makes the Wollheimian no better off than me in 
this respect.  
 
(v) Pictures depicting subject matter that appears to project from the picture 
surface 
 
My examples so far have dealt with subject matter that appears to lie behind the 
picture surface. But as I have mentioned, subject matter can also appear to project 
from a picture’s surface. How does transparency figure in our experience of such 
pictures? I have an elegant response to this question. Let me use as an example a 
chalk drawing by the pavement artist Julian Beever, Pre-Modernist and Post-
Modernist.53 Working on a paved mall, Beever uses anamorphic projection techniques 
to give the impression that a large rectangle of bricks has been removed from the 
pavement. The missing bricks are drawn so they appear assembled in a nearby stack, 
reminiscent of Carl Andre’s infamous Minimalist sculpture Equivalent VIII. Standing 
at precisely the right viewpoint the depicted bricks appear to sit atop the surface on 
which they are in fact drawn, and one might get the uncanny sense that Andre, or 
some errant council workers, have been labouring here. But though its technique is 
trompe l’oeil in this sense, as a chalk drawing it is unlikely to genuinely ‘trick the 
eye’. Indeed, as is generally the case with pavement drawings, one can readily discern 
traces of the pavement beneath the drawing: both the furrows between the pavers, and 
their rough surface texture remain visible throughout the chalk drawing. 
 
                                               
53 Photographic documentation is on Beever’s website, http://www.julianbeever.net 
(accessed 20 October 2014). 
 Part of the experience this work occasions is now familiar: where the gap in 
the pavement is depicted, the actual pavement (that is, the picture surface) appears 
transparent. Viewing photographic documentation of the work, one especially remains 
aware of the furrows in the pavement, which, chalked over for the most part, take on a 
faint transparent presence, through which appears the sandy space depicted beneath 
the pavement. It is the other part of the chalk drawing, that depicting the bricks, which 
provides the answer to my question: here one sees the pavement surface through the 
depicted pile of bricks. The depicted bricks have a ghostly, almost glassy presence 
through which features of the actual pavement, especially the grid of the furrows 
between the bricks, remain dimly visible. So, my proposal needs a simple adjustment 
when subject matter appears to project from the picture surface. In these cases, rather 
than seeing the subject matter through the seemingly transparent picture surface, we 
see the surface through the seemingly transparent subject matter.54 
 
7. Imbrication and inflection 
 
I return now to the experience of imbrication, to clarify the phenomenon, and to 
outline how it relates to a similar concept, inflection, which has attracted some 
attention in the philosophical literature on pictures. I have used the term imbrication 
to indicate the appearance of a picture’s subject matter when textural features of 
brushwork are attributed to the surface of the subject matter rather than the picture. As 
                                               
54 There are further cases for which I have developed treatments in terms of 
transparency and imbrication, but limitations of space preclude discussing them here. 
These include pictures in a ‘flat’ style, such as some Post-Impressionist, Romanesque 
and Byzantine painting, and – a complex case – pictures using hatching or 
crosshatching. I hope to present this material elsewhere. 
I have said, these elements of actual texture then appear ‘imbricated’ with the textural 
features of the subject matter depicted by tonal modelling. 
 
 What is the experiential character of imbrication? I have claimed that it is an 
experience of composite texture, drawing the idea from Watanabe and Cavanagh. But 
what does such an experience amount to? Watanabe and Cavanagh’s work provides 
less guidance here – they imply that experience of composite textures is possible, but 
they do not give a description of it. So let me venture a description myself. Consider 
an example: the depiction by a painter of hair. Often a painter will not attempt to 
depict hairs individually. Instead she follows the general direction of the hair with the 
brush, giving a texture that gives some suggestion of individual hairs (through the 
texture left by the bristles of the brush), their length (through the length of 
brushstrokes) and their shape (which the brushstrokes and bristle marks follow). At 
the same time, the painter varies the tones of these brushstrokes. Partly this tonal 
variation models the general volumes that the hair fills, much as other forms are 
depicted using tone. But it also serves to depict features of the hair’s texture: darker 
tones mark the shadows where locks of hair separate from one another, and lighter 
tones indicate where the light catches it.  
 
 We experience these not as two textures – the actual texture of the paint, and 
the texture represented by tonal variation – but as a single texture, the texture of the 
depicted hair. It seems to me that this apparent texture is produced according to the 
following rule, or one much like it. Consider texture as a raised pattern that is applied 
to an object’s surface. Two such patterns – call these component textures – can be 
applied one over the top of the other, and the result will be a third texture. I suggest 
that we experience the composite texture as a single texture that is the outcome of 
such a process. There must be a similarity in size and orientation of the marks for a 
composite texture to be perceived, so it follows that the experience of the composite 
will tend to be a strengthened version of its components. That is, a visible 
multiplication of textural elements will occur, and where individual textural elements 
overlap, they will appear to fuse and obtrude further. This seems a good account of 
the experience that the use of texture in painting hair yields. The texture of the paint 
enriches the texture depicted using tone: more fibres seem visible, and the sense of 
relief is accentuated. 
 
 One may ask, how does our experience of such a composite texture allow us to 
distinguish the separate contributions of real texture, and tonal modelling? My 
account allows that while we apprehend the texture as a single texture, we can 
recognize aspects of the composite texture as having the texture of paint rather than 
that of the subject matter. The texture of the brushstrokes needs to satisfy Watanabe 
and Cavanagh’s conditions of orientation and size, but otherwise does not need to be 
much like the actual texture of the depicted subject for imbrication to occur. So in 
contributing to the experience of the composite texture, it also retains its visibly 
brushstroked appearance. That is to say, the subject matter appears to take on textural 
properties of the paint (an effect that aligns imbrication with inflection, as will be 
clear below). 
 
 Note too, that as I have discussed in section 5, this experience can alternate 
with a visual awareness of the medium as medium, but in doing so the viewer loses 
awareness of the subject matter. In this case we see the paint’s tonal and textural 
properties as they in fact are. Together these points allow for a rather richer 
experience of a painting than might at first be apparent on my account. For instance: if 
we visually fasten on to a brushstroke, and step back, we can retain the awareness of 
the brushstroke’s texture as our awareness of its association with the surface ebbs, and 
it appears to become imbricated with the subject matter. 
 
 Imbrication bears a close relation to inflection. Inflection describes the 
experience of a picture in which a picture’s subject matter is inflected with qualities of 
the medium.   For Hopkins, inflection occurs when ‘what is seen in a surface includes 
properties a full characterization of which needs to make reference to that surface’s 
design (conceived as such).’55 With typical analytic cautiousness Hopkins claims only 
that there is at least one example of inflection (in Rembrandt’s pen and ink drawing 
Jan Cornelisz Sylvius, c. 1646, British Museum, London). But it is clear that there are 
a great many more instances than this. Michael Podro, on whom Hopkins draws, finds 
an example of in Veronese’s Unfaithfulness (c. 1575, National Gallery, London), 
observing that ‘the sense of the brush across the heavy weave canvas intimates the 
physical immanence of the woman’s back.’56 The woman’s skin appears to take on 
qualities of the painted surface which inflects the sense of form that Veronese 
achieves through the more standard means of tonal modelling. On the basis of this, 
                                               
55 Robert Hopkins, ‘Inflected Pictorial Experience: Its Treatment and Significance’, in 
Catharine Abell and Katerina Bantinaki (eds), Philosophical Perspectives on 
Depiction (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 151–180, at 158. 
56 Podro, Depiction, 13.  
imbrication may seem to be the same thing as inflection, or at least a kind of 
inflection, and I would be comfortable with the later interpretation.57  
 
 However, Hopkins argues that inflection presents two challenges for what he 
calls divisive accounts of seeing-in, of which mine is, in a sense, an example.58 I will 
show how my approach escapes these challenges, but first I will need to explain the 
distinction Hopkins has made between divisive and unitary accounts of seeing-in.59 
All accounts of seeing-in will make a distinction of content: between the experience 
of the picture surface and the subject matter seen-in it. However there is a question, as 
Hopkins puts it, of ‘whether the distinction between the two dimensions of content in 
pictorial experience is taken to correspond to any further divide in its nature’.60 
Divisive accounts hold that it does; unitary accounts maintain that it does not. My 
account is part divisive and part unitary. It is divisive in so far as it analyses seeing-in 
in terms of transparency perception: for that implies that we could, at least 
conceivably, experience the two components independently of one another. However 
inflection (at least in the guise of imbrication) plays no part in this experience. It is 
                                               
57 Podro’s and Hopkins’ treatments of inflection are not limited to texture; they also 
extend to the sense of motion brushmarks can have. 
58 Hopkins, ‘Inflected Pictorial Experience’, 171–179. Bence Nanay argues against 
Hopkins’ claim that divisive accounts may not accommodate inflection, though 
Nanay’s approach differs from mine. (Bence Nanay, ‘Inflected and Uninflected 
Experience of Pictures’, in Abell and Bantinaki (eds), Philosophical Perspectives on 
Depiction, 181–207. 
59 Robert Hopkins, ‘Inflected Pictorial Experience’, 167–171. 
60 Ibid., 170. 
unitary so far as it analyses seeing-in in terms of imbrication – since it is an 
experience of a single composite surface. 
 
 The first problem that inflection presents for divisive accounts is this. Divisive 
accounts imply that when inflection occurs the picture surface will feature twice in 
our experience of the picture: we will be simultaneously aware of both the picture 
surface itself, and of the subject matter as inflected with the properties of the picture 
surface. Hopkins is right to point out that this does not reflect our actual experience of 
pictures. As he says of the Rembrandt drawing, the ‘ink strokes do not figure twice 
over’ in our visual awareness.61 But as I have described, when imbrication occurs, the 
pictorial experience is unitary. One does not experience the texture as being of the 
picture surface; instead it is experienced just once, as a feature of the subject matter. 
Thus my account is not vulnerable to this criticism. 
 
 Hopkins’ second objection is complex, so let me extract from it that part that 
challenges my approach. Hopkins writes, 
 
Anything bearing inflected properties is not just an unusual sort of entity, 
but one that somehow combines aspects drawn from very different orders 
of reality: the world of design and the world of scenes visible in design. 
Can Standard Visual Representation offer us that? Until we have a 
satisfactory answer, the divisive account is threatened … .62 
 
Hopkins’ concern is that it is difficult to see how the two aspects of seeing-in can be 
combined when a divisive account typically begins (as mine does) by stressing that 
they are best understood as akin to ordinary face-to-face visual experience, (Standard 
                                               
61 Ibid., 171. 
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Visual Representation as Hopkins calls it). 
 
 The key to answering this worry lies in being clear about what is being 
combined. On my account, we could consider ‘what is combined’ in two ways, and 
neither poses the kind of problem Hopkins raises.  On one hand, we might consider 
that it is the component stimuli – patterns of light, distinctive of two component 
textures, call them X and Y. These stimuli are only drawn from ‘different orders of 
reality’ in that one is produced by a real texture, say X, and the other is produced not 
by Y, but by a tonal pattern distinctive of Y. Nothing precludes the possibility of these 
two patterns of light being combined into a stimulus distinctive of a composite of 
textures. On the other hand we might consider that it is two different experiences that 
are combined. My analysis of Rembrandt’s painting shows that this does indeed 
occur.  The resultant experience of imbrication in such a painting can be understood 
as a combination of an awareness of paint texture and the awareness of texture 
occasioned by the tonal pattern. Perhaps we may say that these awarenesses are from 
‘different orders of reality’ in that one is produced by a real texture and the other is 
produced by a flat pattern of tone. But as my analysis of Rembrandt’s painting shows, 
that does not preclude the combination of the two awarenesses. Thus, contra Hopkins’ 
concerns, an understanding of ordinary visual experience does indeed give us the 
resources to describe the experience of imbrication. 
 
9. What seeing-in is 
 
Let me now draw together my account of seeing-in and say something about its 
implications. I have argued that in some cases, seeing-in involves transparency 
perception, and in other cases it involves a perception of imbrication. More 
exactingly: 
 
To see X in Y is either (a) to have a transparency perception incorporating 
a veridical visual awareness of Y, and a non-veridical visual awareness of 
X, or (b), to have a non-veridical visual awareness of X in which Y’s 
facture appears imbricated with X’s surface. In both cases the awareness 
of X is counterfactually dependent on the presence of Y. 
 
I have already lingered over the different ways X and Y can be experienced, and the 
role of counterfactual dependence here is a straightforward matter, so let me pass over 
these to focus on a final issue around the perception of X, the seen-in object. 63 We 
have a visual experience of X, but X is not present. What does it mean to have an 
experience of an absent object?  
 
 I reject the suggestion that this experience, qua experience, is different in kind 
to that of ordinary face-to-face seeing. As I conceive it, there is no necessary 
qualitative difference between the two. The only essential point of difference is that 
the visual awareness of X is counterfactually dependent not on the presence of X, as it 
is in veridical seeing, but on the presence of the surface, Y. There are other 
differences, and though these do not occur in all instances, they still call for 
explanation. I identify two here.64 The first arises from the fact that we typically do 
                                               
63 For the concept of counterfactual dependence, see Lewis, ‘Veridical Hallucination 
and Prosthetic Vision’. 
64 I discuss these in Newall, What is a Picture?, 33. One might wonder if there is a 
third difference: that unlike face-to-face vision, pictures do not convey what Gregory 
not believe we are in the presence of an object when we see it in a picture (though 
occasionally we may, as when we are tricked by trompe l’oeil). The worry here is that 
the non-veridical experience of seeing may not be compatible with a belief that X is 
truly present. Reflection on examples of ordinary seeing involving optical illusions 
shows that this should not be a concern. To take one example, a viewer aware of the 
bent stick illusion can have a non-veridical visual experience of the half-submerged 
stick as bent, despite simultaneously believing the stick to be straight. Seeing need not 
always be believing. The second difference is that a seen-in object is often 
experienced as having different visible properties than would be apparent to the 
viewer face-to-face with the object. For instance, we do not experience the subject 
matter in a sepia photograph as having properties of hue (at least not those which we 
would ordinarily see in life), and we do not experience people’s faces as having quite 
the rough painterly textural properties that Rembrandt can give them. Although these 
particular experiences may be unique to pictures, examples of ordinary vision show 
that these kinds of experience – in which objects are visually experienced as having 
different properties to those normally available face-to-face – are not unique to 
pictorial experience. In situations where our ability to see is reduced, we typically 
                                                                                                                                      
Currie calls ‘egocentric information’. That is, while face-to-face vision gives us 
‘information about the spatial and temporal relations between the object seen and 
ourselves’, pictorial experience does not give us information about such relations 
between ourselves and the subject matter. (Gregory Currie, Image and Mind: Film, 
Philosophy, and Cognitive Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
66.) It will be apparent from section 2 that I believe that pictures do in fact provide 
such egocentric information, at least regarding spatial relations – only that the 
information they provide is non-veridical.  
have visual awareness of things without experiencing them as having their full gamut 
of usually visible properties. So, in darkness we may not be able to see hues, and in 
fog we may not see detail. In situations where something (say, a person) we have seen 
before reappears to us, but with changed properties (say, a new hairstyle, plastic 
surgery, etc.), we may still experience it as the same object – that is we still recognize 
it – but we experience it as having new properties.  
 
 I finish by briefly indicating two consequences of this revised understanding 
of the phenomenology of seeing-in. The first is etiological. It is reasonable to ask why 
instances of seeing-in happen to have the phenomenology of transparency perception. 
Without an explanation, this would seem a surprising coincidence. But it is not hard to 
lay out a plausible explanation. Suppose that such experiences are occasioned by the 
engagement of a single recognitional ability, an ability to perceive transparency. As 
we have seen, it is easy to understand how such an ability would be evolutionarily 
advantageous, for it would have helped our ancestors – both recent and distant pre-
human – to negotiate their physical environment. Seeing-in involving twofoldness 
could then be understood as a ‘spandrel’, to use Stephen J. Gould and Richard 
Lewontin’s term, a by-product of the ability to perceive physical transparency – 
coupled with our capacity for non-veridical perception.65 So it is plausible to think 
that the use of pictures exploits and depends upon our ability to perceive physical 
transparency.  
 
                                               
65 Stephen Jay Gould and Richard C. Lewontin, ‘The Spandrels of San Marco and the 
Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme’, Proceedings of 
the Royal Society of London, Series B, 205 (1979), 581–98. 
 The second consequence might well already be clear from what I have said, 
but should be spelled out. We have seen that the experience of seeing-in, when it is 
twofold, is rightly understood as a species of well-known perception – a non-veridical 
transparency perception. A lingering concern may remain: that there is some 
circularity to this account. In explaining seeing-in partly in terms of transparency 
perception, one might be anxious that little has been explained, only that the burden of 
explanation has been shifted to the phenomenon of transparency perception, which 
will prove to have something rather like the old Wollheimian twofoldness at its core 
once subjected to proper analysis. But we are not returned to anything quite like 
Wollheim’s twofoldness, for the account I gave at the start of section 5 clarifies the 
relation between surface and the object seen in it that Wollheim leaves obscure: it is 
the now familiar relation of overlapping without occlusion. One might still worry that 
if we were to begin with an idea of the stimulus colour as a picture-like surface, and to 
suppose that this was perceived simultaneously with the awareness of transparent 
bodies overlapping, that would indeed threaten a return to a Wollheimian position. 
But we have already seen in section 5 that Metelli rejects the possibility that veridical 
perception of stimulus colour and transparency perception occur simultaneously. So 
there is no prospect of circularity. 
 
 This means that the apparent relation between a surface and what is seen in it 
is no more puzzling than other kinds of visual perception that (veridically or 
otherwise) represent to us spatial and material properties of the kind we are apt to see 
on a day-to-day basis. So, in explaining seeing-in in terms of such kinds of 
perception, the central philosophical problem it poses – explaining the nature of 
twofold experience – is solved.66 
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